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ABSTRACT 
 
It is widely accepted that good governance and transparency in the extractive sector is the 
precursor to the realisation of economic and social growth. On the other hand technical and 
institutional flaws are a recipe for economic loss, resource curse or revenue leakage and low 
return. 
 
Kenya, in the year 2019, made an overhaul of its energy and petroleum laws in line with the 
constitutional dictates and response to policy and legal reform. The changes present a 
significant departure from the former regime that was restrictive and fell short of the 
internationally accepted standards and best practices. This research therefore aims at 
contextualising the reforms that have been introduced by the new energy and petroleum laws 
in relation to discretion given to the Cabinet Secretary in licensing of oil and gas blocks. 
 
In that regard, the research focuses on transparency in licensing, management and control of 
hydrocarbon blocks and hydrocarbon rights. Kenya’s new hydrocarbon blocks licensing 
regime represents a shift towards competitive bidding through bidding rounds. However, the 
Petroleum Act, 2019 offers no criterion or the manner of conducting such bidding rounds. 
Further, the new law still leaves much of the powers and discretion in licensing of hydrocarbon 
blocks with the Cabinet Secretary in charge of Petroleum. Such power under section 10, 18 & 
126 of the Petroleum Act, 2019, creates opacity which could potentially lead to conflict 
between the community and the IOC and/or the Government and create avenues or conducive 
medium for corruption which could lead to economic loss and revenue leakage. 
 
The research therefore is premised on the view that having a transparent licensing regime on 
oil and gas blocks in a country diffuses avenues of corruption and potential conflict between 
the community and the IOC and/or the Government. Comparatively, to illustrate the potential 
for abuse in cases of weak governmental systems or flaws in a country's regulatory machinery, 
the research delves into the Nigerian case of Famfa Oil Limited. The case pits an indigenous 
Nigerian oil company Famfa Oil in the allocation of OPL 216 and its later conversion to OML 
127 and the controversy over the “Back – in – rights” by the government. The research also 
borrows the comparative experience of Ghana as its legal regime is considered to be one of the 
few in Africa which has entrenched transparency and promoted accountability in the extractive 
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In conclusion, the research recommends a raft of changes and security measures (safety valves) 
to cure the flaws that exist and persist in the current law. The study suggests that the powers of 
the Cabinet Secretary should be truncated to minimise the effect of the slippery slope that such 
arbitrary powers harbour. It also recommends the definition and introduction of a clear cut 
procedure for calling and conducting bidding rounds to breathe certainty into the system and 
promote transparency; proposes that in the absence of competitive bidding powers for direct 
negotiation be vested in an independent authority. The research, in addition, borrows the 
concept of “Back-in-rights” and encourages the Kenyan parliament to legislate on the same to 
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Back – in – Rights (Rule) 
 
Department of Energy and Climate Change 
 
Energy and Petroleum 
 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
 
Electronic Kenya Law Reports 
 




Gross Domestic Product 
 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
 
International Oil Company 
 
Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited 
 
Maximising Economic Recovery in the United Kingdom 
 
National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee NFFAC 
 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
 
National Oil Corporation 
 
National Upstream Petroleum Advisory Committee 
 
Oil and Gas Authority 
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This research aims at contextualising the reforms that have been introduced by the new energy and 
petroleum laws in relation to the discretion given to the Cabinet Secretary in charge of petroleum 
in licensing of oil and gas blocks. It focuses on transparency in licensing, management and control 
of hydrocarbon blocks and hydrocarbon rights. It further centres on the inadequacy of the 
Petroleum Act, 2019 to give a formula or procedure for conducting the bidding rounds.
1
 
Considerable analysis is also given to the fact that the Act vests considerable power on the Cabinet 




Oil and gas are vital natural resources and are deemed to be public assets.
3
 Therefore, they vest in 
the people of the Republic of Kenya who are the custodians of sovereign wealth and power.
4
 
Management of such wealth is however vested in the government of the Republic of Kenya as a 
trustee. The People, through a social contract, donate power to the government. However, in 
donating such power to the common trustee, the government, the people do not cede all power to 
make and implement all decisions.
5
 They retain a residual control, crucial in ensuring that the 
country’s resources are managed and utilised transparently and optimally. This residual power, is 
the basis for checks and balances. 
 
On the other hand, whilst the government is managing such natural wealth and controlling it as a 
trustee for the people, the larger citizenry has a right to know what happens to their natural 





Section 18, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
2
See section 10, 18 & 126, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
3
Article 62 (1) (f), article 260, Constitution of Kenya, 2010 on the definition of natural resources;, Clause 41 (1); 
Petroleum (Production and Exploration) Act, Cap 308, Section 17.  
4 Article 62 (1) (f), Constitution of Kenya, 2010 classifies minerals as public land which is in turn held in trust for 
the Kenyan people by the government under article 62 (2) and (3).
  
5 Njoya & 6 Others v Attorney-General and 3 Others, Misc. Civil Application No. 82 of 2004. The people are the constituent power and the 
sovereignty of the people is entrenched in the constitution. 
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country’s resources are managed and utilised in a transparent manner.
6
 In 2003, this residual power 
in the people inspired the formation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by 
international actors majorly to tackle the ‘resource curse’ problem.
7
 The initiative was aimed at 
achieving transparency in the management of hydrocarbon rights. It basically requires all 
extractive companies operating within a nation’s territory to disclose resource related payments 
made to the government. The government is in turn required to publish what it receives. These 
figures are then reconciled by an independent body drawing its membership from all sectors of the 
governance structure of a country’s extractive industry.
8
 This forms the crux of contract 
transparency and governance from the licensing of oil blocks to production contracts. 
 
Historically, the management and exploration of petroleum has seen a general shift in contractual 
structures and agreements from concessions
9
 to profit-sharing contracts.
10
 The uniqueness of the 
oil and gas sector encompassing property rights, governmental trusteeship and contract is the 
justification for this shift.
11
 In Kenya, since the discovery of oil by Tullow Oil, the focus has 
shifted to legal and policy framework in oil and petroleum. In light of that, Kenya has entered into 
petroleum agreements with international oil exploration companies and utilised profit sharing 
agreements to settle their relationships and govern their intercourse.
12 
 
Before the current energy and petroleum laws came into force, exploration of oil and gas in Kenya 
and the upstream sector was vested in the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum without an 
independent regulator.
13
 The enactment of the Petroleum Act, 2019 and the Energy Act, 2019 
 
 
6 Standard Editorial, Resolve blockade in Turkana before it undermines oil find , The Standard Digital, 2nd July, 2018 
at <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001286285/resolve-blockade-in-turkana-before-it-undermines-oil-
find> on 25th February, 2018.  
7 Patricia Galvão Ferreira, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Using a Global Public-Private Partnership to Facilitate Domestic 
Governance  
8 Patricia Galvão Ferreira, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Using a Global Public-Private Partnership to Facilitate Domestic 
Governance  
9 Telmage Hunt III E. T, ‘Fiscal Aspects of Petroleum Exploration and Production Agreements’, 37.: investor took title over the natural resources 
and paid royalties, rent and tax to the government  
10 Telmage Hunt III E. T, ‘Fiscal Aspects of Petroleum Exploration and Production Agreements’, 37.: the government retains title to the 
hydrocarbons and the investor receives a portion of the production as reimbursement of costs and of profit. 
11 Maxwell C. Richard, ‘Oil and Gas Law and the End of its Great Era’ in MacDonnell J. Lawrence and Bates F.   
Sarah (eds), Natural Resources Policy and Law: Trends and Directions, Island Press, Washington, D. C, 93 -123.  
12 Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas Resources, Perspectives of the Civil Society, The Kenya Civil 
Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), 2014, 30
  
13 Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas Resources, Perspectives of the Civil Society, The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas 
(KCSPOG), 2014, 30 
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introduces the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) with the power to issue non-
exclusive petroleum exploration permits on a block among others.
14
 There is also established 
under the Petroleum Act the National Upstream Petroleum Advisory Committee (NUPAC) to 
replace the National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee (NFFAC) on a purely advisory role. 
15
 The 
new introductions posit the question as to whether the systems as layered in the said Acts are well 
placed to take care of the emerging dynamics of exploration and oil production in Kenya, 
enhancing management of mineral rights and governance of the collective resources of the people 
of Kenya. 
 
Under the Petroleum Act, 2019, the Cabinet Secretary enters into petroleum exploration 
agreements, but the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority grants the non-exclusive 
exploration permits to the oil companies on gazetted blocks.
16
 The government may also engage 
itself directly in oil exploration through contracts with private or public companies expressing 
interest in upstream petroleum.
17
 With private companies, the principal vehicle for such ventures 
is profit sharing agreements
18
, which call for transparency in management for the betterment of 
society and the welfare of the people of Kenya. This invites an analysis of the system and its 
efficacy in managing hydrocarbon rights in Kenya. 
 
In 2013, Kenya mooted and actualised the shift of her policy framework to competitive bidding 
(licensing round) in granting exploration blocks.
19
 This shift was occasioned by a spirited move for 
transparency and entrenchment of best governance practices in governance of resources.
20
 Section 18 
of Petroleum Act 2019 now provides for competitive bidding to replace direct negotiations.
21
 Under 





Sections 22, 23 and 24, Petroleum Act, 2019 gives the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority the right to grant 
an exclusive exploration permit and operational permits to the applicants keen on prospecting or engaging in oil gas 
production/exploration as provided for in the Act. 
15
Section 12, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
16
Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
17 The National Oil Corporation is fully owned by the government for purposes of oil exploration  
18
Kindiki Kithure, Synchronising Kenya’s Energy Law with the Framework Environmental Law in Okidi C. O, 
Kameri – Mbote P., Akech Migai, Environmental Governance in Kenya: Implementing the Framework Law, East 
African Educational Publishers, Nairobi, 372 – 390.  
19 Hubert Don, The Use of Tax Havens in the Ownership of Kenyan Petroleum Rights, Resource for 
Development Consulting, 2016, 9 <www.oxfam.org> 5
th
May, 2018.  
20 Melba K. Wasunna ‘Kenya Transparency Scorecard; Transparency in Kenya’s Extractive Sector’, Extractives Baraza, 2017, Issue 1. 
 
21 Section 18 (5) (c), Petroleum Act, 2019 
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a petroleum agreement, it must be transparent and competitive.
22
 Even though the move to include 
competitive bids by the Petroleum Act, 2019, is a step towards the right direction in increasing 
transparency; Having an independent oversight body like the Energy and Petroleum Authority to 
check the process of awarding oil and gas blocks limits avenues of corruption. It is key in averting 
potential conflict between the community and the IOC and/or Government. In Ghana, for instance, 
the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act provides for the baseline terms of the essential 
terms of a contract that must be present in a license/contract to oil prospecting firms. It also 
includes the minimum work requirements that a licensee must perform in order for its license to 
be renewed.
23
 The Ghanaian Act also encompasses reporting standards on the findings and 
appraising the Petroleum Commission of Ghana on their activities as a way of promoting 
transparency. 
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
 
The need for an ideal framework in management of the natural resources of a country cannot be 
gainsaid. In Kenya, the provision under Section 18 (4) of the Petroleum Act, which obligates the 
Cabinet Secretary to publish a 30-day notice in the website, the Gazette and in two newspapers of 
nationwide circulation of intention to negotiate directly with a contractor, is a positive step in 
promoting transparency. However, transparency and accountability needs to have the backing of 
information and guarantees on its availability. Without information, transparency is of no utility, 
it is a mirage. Since the Petroleum Act does not provide for information disclosure on bids 
submitted be they responsive or unresponsive, there is potential for secrecy and selective 
disclosure. The Petroleum Act nonetheless does not wholly orient itself on strict bidding that 
promotes competition and transparency. It still provides instances where the Cabinet Secretary can 
negotiate directly.
24
The choice of direct negotiation is deemed to be a non-transparent process and 








Section 17 (1), Petroleum Act, 2019 provides that “where the national government enters into a petroleum 
agreement, under this Act, it shall do so fairly, equitably, transparently, competitively and cost effectively.” 
23
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016, Section 23. 
24
Section 18 (3), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
25
Partick Bajari et al, ‘Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis’ Vol. 25, No. 2, 
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization (2009) pp. 372 – 399. 
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The Cabinet Secretary has the power to make rules,
26
 a factor that further aggravates the risk of 
abuse. Although the Cabinet Secretary only operates under the advice of the Energy and Petroleum 
Authority (EPRA),
27
section 10 (2) of the Petroleum Act 2019 provides that they may decline the 
recommendations of the authority with reasons in writing within fourteen (14) days. Auxiliary to 
that, Section 10 spells out the powers of the Cabinet Secretary, which are vast and influential. In 
such instances with vast extensive unchecked discretion, there arises potential avenues for 
corruption and conflict between the community and the IOC and/or Government. 
 
The problem posited by the unchecked discretion Cabinet Secretary in charge of energy and 
petroleum enjoys in licensing of oil and gas blocks under section 10, 18 & 126 of the Petroleum 
Act, 2019 is that it in turn creates room for opacity. This, from the benefit of hindsight, could lead 
to conflict between the community and the IOC and/or the Government and create avenues for 
corruption resulting to economic loss and revenue leakage. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
 




The research aims at contextualising the reforms that have been introduced by the new energy and 
petroleum laws in Kenya in relation to the discretion given to the Cabinet Secretary in licensing 




a) To analyse the viability and the prospects of having an independent regulator limit the 
potential for conflict of interest among agencies in the petroleum sector and avenues for 
corruption, revenue loss and leakage through checks and balances and severability of 








Section 126, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
27
Section 10, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
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b) To analyse and audit the discretion granted to the Cabinet Secretary in charge of petroleum 
on licensing of oil and gas blocks by the Petroleum Act under section 10, 18 & 126 and 
explore the latent danger of abuse vis a vis the experiences of other jurisdictions like 
Nigeria. 
 
c) To access how a country can avoid sailing the avenues of corruption and conflict between 
the community and the IOC and/or the Government by entrenching a transparent licensing 
regime on oil and gas blocks in the country like Ghana did. 
 
d) To provide suggestions for improving the system by identifying the flaws that exist. 
 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
 
In achieving the above-stated objectives, this research is guided by the following research 
questions:- 
 
a) Does the discretion the Petroleum Act (under sections 10, 18 and 126) grants the Cabinet 
Secretary in charge of petroleum to license oil and gas blocks interfere with transparency 
and accountability? 
 
b) Could this discretion lead to abuse of power? 
 
c) How have comparable jurisdictions controlled the power of licencing oil and gas 
exploration? 
 
1.6 Literature Review 
 
 
Transparency and Access to Information 
 
A myriad of scholarly writings on hydrocarbon rights world over leaves no doubt of the wealth of 
knowledge and literature available. The existence of such research notwithstanding, there is an 
apparent gap when it comes to a nation’s specialised and technical know-how on its hydrocarbon 
realm. Despite advancements espoused in other jurisdictions, some budding potential oil producers 
have come to terms with how little or secretive information on hydrocarbon rights and 
management have happened to be. As Odote C observes, the public’s access to information is a 
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In Friends of Lake Turkana Trust v Attorney General & 2 others,
29
 the litigants submitted before 
the honourable court that there is a growing international consensus flowing from the European 
Court of Justice in the case of Guerra & others v Italy which held that governments must collect 
and disseminate environmental information. The court went ahead to note that public participation 
which enhances transparency and accountability in the awarding of public resources will remain a 
mirage if the right to access information is not actualised and information made freely available. 
 
Melba K. Wasunna on the other hand states that information plays a central role in transparency 
of the extractive industry and is vital in averting conflict and complications related to opacity.
30
 
She further observes that the Kenyan law in place currently is opaque and riddled with 
confidentiality clauses that make access to the terms of petroleum contracts complicated. She also 
observes that the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2015 (now an Act) 
seeks to bridge the gap and cure the asymmetry that currently plagues the system on transparency 
and disclosure.
31
This is in agreement with the findings in the case of Friends of Lake Turkana 
Trust v Attorney General & 2 others,
32
 which held that there could never be meaningful public 
participation by the citizens if there is no information that is the manure of an informed decision 
and fruitful public participation. The role that information access plays in promoting transparency 
cannot be gainsaid. The ugly overtones of opacity and secrecy are well known. 
 
Art Durnev et al. in their treatise opine that sound property framework, information access, and 







Odote Collins, ‘Access to Information Law in Kenya: Rationale and Policy Framework’, The Kenyan Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ Kenya), 2015. 
29
[2014] eKLR.  
30
Melba K. Wasunna, ‘Improving access to Information in Kenya’s Extractives Sector’ (Extractives Baraza, Policy 
Brief 01, March 2017).  
31
Melba K. Wasunna, Kenya Information Needs Assessment in the Extractives Sector (Extractive Baraza – 
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asymmetry between key players.
33
 This, in turn, promotes mutual agreements and locks out 
suspicion over the lack of some of the information necessary in decision making. Such 
transparency and good governance practices contribute to the creation of a system that is viable 
for investors looking to invest and have security in their investment.
34
 This agrees with the 
accepted principles of negotiation and contract processes that eventually contribute to a cohesive 
system that is mindful of its players and stakeholders in general. 
 
Damilola S. Olawuyi observes that the right to access information is sacrosanct, that the same has 
been enshrined in Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 13 of the American 
Declaration of Human Rights (ADHR).
35
 This right has in turn been lauded as allowing individuals 
and communities to access information on government projects that would affect them either 
directly or indirectly. This access to information and the knowledge of the actions of governments 
and the activities of extractive firms have led to spirited efforts to improve environmental 
protection such as the Ogoni Case
36
 and the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation in Nigeria.
37
Nigeria 
for example, in the process of reviewing its oil and gas legal framework to address the perennial 
problem of revenue leakage and opacity seeks to develop a viable legal framework for public 
participation and disclosure of information in the management of petroleum rights.
38 
 
In Kenya, the right to access information is enshrined in article 35 of the Constitution of Kenya, 
2010. This right, as Mingcong accurately observes, is vital to the realisation of other rights and the 
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tax collection structures.
39
 It is critical in the achievement of the benefits and aspirations of 
Kenyans. 
 
Allocation of Rights in the Oil and Gas Industry 
 
In 2012, Kenya struck its first significant oil discovery in block 10BB and joined countries with 
oil producing potential after years of unsuccessful attempts. After the clamour and the oil discovery 
euphoria settled, attention shifted towards the lucrative oil blocks.
40
 The discovery opened a 
scholarly debate on the process of bidding, allocation and relinquishment of oil blocks in Kenya. 
There are different approaches by different countries and systems on bidding, allocation and 
relinquishment of oil blocks. Silvana Tordo for instance groups allocation systems into (i) Open-
door systems (Energy & Petroleum (E&P) where rights are allocated as a result of negotiation 
between the government and interested investors through solicited or unsolicited expression of 
interest) and; (ii) Licensing rounds.
41
 She further identifies two types of licensing rounds: (i) 
Administrative procedures, in which E&P rights are allocated through an administrative 
adjudication process based on a set of criteria defined by the government; and (ii) Auctions, in 
which rights go to the highest bidder.
42 
 
Silvana Tordo further observes that in open-door systems, the criteria for award are often not pre-
defined and known to market participants; the government retains considerable discretionary 
power and flexibility in awarding E&P rights.
43
 This, like under the repealed Act in Kenya, creates 
the potential for abuse and is a precursor to unaccountability and opacity that in turn lead to 
revenue leakage and loss. This discretion as Cordaid Kenya observes at times alienates the 





Mingcong L, ‘Corruption, Transparency and the Resource Curse’, 3 International Journal of Social Science and 
Humanity, November 2013.  
40
Cordaid Kenya, Oil Exploration in Kenya: Success Requires Consultation - Assessment of Community Perceptions 
of Oil Exploration in Turkana County, Kenya (Report) August, 2015, 22.  
41
Silvana Tordo et al Silvan Tordo, David Johnstone and Daniel Johnston, “Countries’ experience With the Allocation 
of Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights: Strategies and Design Issues.” 2009 World Bank Working Paper- 
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August 2015 while quoting a community representative during a focus group discussion in 
Nakukulas, Turkana South that “Our Camel is being milked while we are watching”.
44 
 
The discovery of oil opens new frontiers for intellectual arguments and dialogue on the various 
concepts in and around exploration development and production of petroleum and natural gas.
45 
 
When oil blocks are advertised, bidding floated and allocated in an open, transparent and 
competitive process; oil companies acquire rights in the blocks. These rights are however not 
exclusive, and the companies have to relinquish them in a defined fashion or upon expiry of a 
particular term. Oil companies can also farm out their interest in a specific oil block. Farm out as 
John S. Lowe observe the involvement of an arrangement between a company that holds drilling 
rights with a company keen on exploring oil in which the rights are given to the other company by 
way of a farm-out agreement.
46
 Various scholars have now narrowed into the dynamics that 
surround the bidding, licensing and relinquishment of these rights as well as the attendant rights.
47 
 
David L. Goldwyn observes that the majority of the world’s resource-rich countries are the most 
ineffective and corrupt. Such failure is attributed to bad governance and lack of transparency.
48
 
With the benefit of hindsight, developing countries have tried to entrench transparency and good 
governance into the extractive industry, especially in Africa and Latin America.
49
 Transparency 
not only serves to afford the people who the mineral rights vest in but also helps to promote 
competitiveness among competing oil exploration firms.
50
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angle is to attract quality investors and support the development of the mineral sector and 
efficiency in licensing of mineral blocks to these firms.
51 
 
Many countries as observed by scholars, have multiple models of ceding and licensing rounds for 
oil prospective firms. In the Kenyan extractive industry, as earlier noted, such is done by way of 
gazetted blocks. The nature of tax or costs payable in the acquisition of the blocks or license to 
explore is based on a country’s fiscal, regulatory and sector policy. 
52
 Such policies aim to raise 
revenue for the government and ensure adequate compensation for the use of the resources and the 
optimum utilisation of the same for sustainability.
53
 Transparency in the management of oil blocks 
has always been a necessary intruder to ensure that the public voice their opinion and concerns in 
the extractive industry.
54
 This research, therefore, seeks to analyse transparency in licensing, 
farming in and out in particular Ngamia 1, which was the first significant oil field in comparison 
with another relevant case of Famfa Oil Limited. This is crucial in understanding the level of 
transparency in licensing entrenched in the Kenyan system and analysing the most viable ways of 
filling in such gaps. 
 
Noteworthy, this research was conducted with the knowledge that the award of Block 10 BB in 
which Ngamia 1 is located was done without much public awareness and it is only after the award 
that questions on how the block was allocated were raised.
55
 Even so, as Jaindi Kisero observes, 
that although the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 requires parliamentary ratification for such sale or 
award of oil blocks, the law to operationalise it had not been passed. This anomaly is further 
buttressed by the public outcry within the Turkana region over the award of oil blocks. Several 
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blocks.
56
 This bespeaks absence of transparency and non – consultation in the process of bidding, 
award and relinquishment of oil blocks. Such issues have precipitated chaos and volatility to the 
extent of being compared to the next Niger Delta.
57 
 
1.7 Approach and Methodology 
 
 
This research was undertaken through the doctrinal methodology. Moni Wekesa states that 
doctrinal research involves the analysis of existing legal rules, principles and doctrines
58
. This 
research further called to play the expository approach, which aims at the world's best practice on 
transparency in oil blocks management. This methodology will look at sources such as Books, 
Law Journals, Articles, Newspapers, Seminar, workshop & Conference Papers, Periodical 
Magazines, Compiled Reports, Lectures, Legal Dictionaries, Internet Usage, and related 
hydrocarbon instruments and Conventions. 
 
A comparative analysis and case study was also employed as David Colliner argues that 
comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis
59
. Arend Lijpharts in his article ‘Comparative 
Politics and Comparative Methods’ defines a comparative method as the analysis of a small 
number of cases, entailing at least two observations. The merit of this method, he argues, is that 
given inevitable scarcity of time, energy and financial resources, the intensive analysis of a few 
cases will be more promising than the superficial statistical analysis of many cases
60
. Research on 
the best practices and successive application in other jurisdictions were also essential in mapping 
the global interface and deciphering the viable agenda for Kenya to adopt in managing resources 
and mineral rights effectively at present and for future generations. More particularly, the Famfa 
Oil Limited case study, being a recent and notorious case study of management of oil and gas 
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appreciate international and global best practices in transparency and management of hydrocarbon 
blocks. The research will also draw lessons from the Republic of Ghana as it is considered 
advanced in enforcing transparency in management of its hydrocarbon rights. 
 
1.8 Scope of the study 
 
 
The research focused on the Kenyan legislative framework on management of oil blocks and a 
comparative case study with Niger Delta and best practices from Ghana. The scope of hydrocarbon 
rights management is broad; therefore, the study will narrow down to oil and gas rights 
management, particularly oil and gas blocks management with a view of transparency in licensing 
thereof. However, the outcome of the study will be a general representation of Kenya's current 
legislative framework on oil blocks management, transparency and other mineral rights in general. 
 
1.9 Limitation of the study 
 
This area of study has not been widely explored particularly in relation to the current petroleum 
and energy laws of Kenya. Therefore, most of the secondary data to be relied upon in the study are 
studies carried out in other countries. However, these experiences from other jurisdictions will be 
key in providing a comparative analysis with the Kenyan scenario. 
 
1.10 Chapter Breakdown 
 
 
Chapter one forms the introductory part of this thesis and lays the ground work. It lays a foundation 
for the research and gives the legal foundation for the problem question to be addressed through 
the study, being the inadequacy of the legal and policy framework in discussing the concept of 
contract transparency and governance in oil blocks licensing and management thereof. 
 
On the second phase, the research is focused on conceptual argument on variables of good 
governance, transparency and accountability to promote economic growth. This forms chapter 
two. It addresses how having an independent oversight body to check the process of awarding oil 
and gas blocks in a country limits avenues of corruption and avoids potential conflict between the 
community and the IOC and/or Government. It further looks at how opacity, unchecked 
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discretion and lack of public participation could result in economic loss, environmental 
degradation and revenue leakages. 
 
In an analytic approach, the third chapter is focused on the domestic legal and legislative 
framework and policies on oil block management and transparency. It puts into perspective the 
existing laws, rules and policy frameworks and the enforcement mechanisms. Further, it looks at 
the international law on oil exploration and production of oil and gas as well as the available 
framework on transparency, i.e. the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).Consequently, it audits the Kenyan standard against the international standards and the 
global transparency standards. 
 
To bring about a comparative feel of the topic, the fourth segment, chapter four, forms the 
comparative analysis of a case study. In this case, the focus was on the case study in the Famfa Oil 
– Folorunsho Alakija allocation of Block OML 127 of the Agbami field in Nigeria. The Chapter 
addresses the approach taken in the jurisdictions and its impact on mineral rights management. 
This is instrumental in coming up with a critical perspective and best comparison framework. In 
this regard, the chapter seeks to explore how Kenya can decipher the success and best practice or 
otherwise learn from lack of it. The chapter will further look at the global best practices as espoused 
in the Republic of Ghana and the United Kingdom which are considered advanced in entrenching 
transparency and governance parameters in line with the global standards. 
 
In summing up the findings of this research, the fifth and final chapter incorporates the conclusions 
and recommendations. This includes the output from all chapters and analytically conclude as to 
the legal position of the problem addressed. In this regard, it will give the possible remedial, legal 
or policy framework to be adopted to conform to the international requirements, conventions and 
best practices on oil block management which will form the basis for recommendations for the 
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The exploitation or the utilization of any natural resource has to be done prudently. There is an 
equilibrium that dictates the balance in any economy. The same is true for the oil and gas sector. 
As Xiaoyi Mu acknowledges, the oil and gas sector operates on its own matrices and translates to 
various results depending on the strategy employed.
61
 When that equilibrium becomes elusive, the 
concept of economic loss chips in.
62 
 
Generally, a nation’s resources are exploited for the benefit of its people. The government is the 
trustee and the custodian of a nation’s resources. As observed by the House of Lords in the case 
of Hedley Byrne vs. Heller & Partners ltd
63
for a claim of economic loss to arise, there must be a 
fiduciary relationship. This is juxtaposed with the fact the exploitation of natural resources is 




Transparency generally denotes openness. In its architectural and philosophical foundation, 
transparency is more of a principle of constitutionalism and human rights.
64
Feichtner, Isabel, et 
al, opine that transparency comes about in order to mitigate the likelihood or the effect of violation 
of human rights.
65
 Transparency generally has several limbs that all together join to support the 
pillars of the concept and to enhance good governance in the extractive industry. An example of a 
subset of transparency is Contract Transparency (Publish What You Pay) which is an interactive 
map showing countries that have published their contracts with extractive companies, 
accompanied by links to the contracts.
66
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that transparency consists of opening up government information to the public for scrutiny by 
society.
67
It does not only imply an act of accountability to a specific person or the simple 
disclosure, but the democratic practice of revealing government information and creating 
participatory and public processes for engaged democracy.
68
 Globally, transparency continues its 
development as a key pillar in hydrocarbon governance;
69
 while the effects of lack of it or 
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At the heart of governance and a civilised society, is the concept of accountability, checks and 
balances. Governance, stripped to its bare minimum denotes the exercise of legitimate power of 
the governed by the governor. At its inception, the human kind desirous of creating an organised 
society ceded power to the governor in the form of a social contract that governs their intercourse. 
Such power however, has always been prone to abuse by the governor and consequently, the 
governed have had to come up with mechanisms of ensuring that balance in the exercise of power 
is achieved. This chapter will contextualise the concept of governance and lay the ground basis as 
a yardstick for auditing transparency and accountability measures in the Kenyan framework. 
 
2.1 Conceptual Argument 
 
 
Having an independent oversight body to check the process of awarding oil and gas blocks in a 
country limits avenues of corruption and avoids potential conflict between the community and the 
IOC and/or Government. 
 
Good governance and transparency in the extractive sector is the precursor to the realisation of 
economic and social growth.
71
 The extractive industry has several key actors. Unique among them, 
however, is the Government. This is because the government has sovereignty over the land and all 
resources within its jurisdiction.
72
 Such power places immense power and advantage on the state 
and cogent checks and balances must be put in place to oversee and mitigate the potential for 
abuse. This is especially critical for a resource dependent country. Mineral resources world over, 
have the potential of improving a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the livelihood of 





71 Nicholas Wasonga Orago and Pauline Vata Musangi, “Titanium Mining Benefit-Sharing in Kwale County: A 
Comprehensive Analysis of the Law and Practice” in J Osogo Ambani (ed), “Drilling Past the Resource Curse?
  
Essays on the governance of extractives in Kenya” (2018) Strathmore University Press. 
72 T.W. Wälde, “In the Arbitration under Art. 26 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Nykomb v. The Republic of Latvia -  
Legal Opinion”, (2005) 2/5 Transnational Dispute Management, 1 – 107.  
73 Soderholm P &Svahn N, ‘Mining, regional development and benefit sharing in developed countries’ 45 Resources Policy Journal (2015), 80 
 
 
Page | 17 
Nandako Sheila Student No. 110361 
 
many jurisdictions, the benefit derived from hydrocarbon and natural resources is the constant 
variable. Some countries advance and manage to get the best from hydrocarbon and other natural 
resources, while others have not been able to derive the best of these resources.
74
 This is the 
constant independent variable in all these jurisdictions. For a nation to achieve the best and 
effectively utilise the benefit derived from most of its non-renewable resources, it has to have 
sound management and transparency structures.
75
 Where such arrangements do not exist or are 
weak, there is a tendency to gravitate towards anarchy, economic loss and into the dark alleys of 
the resource curse. 
 
This apparent disjoint between the two scenarios have informed the debate as to why some 
resource-rich countries have underperformed compared with resource-rich countries.
76
 This 
mirror effect draws a picture of a constant variable being the levels of development derived from 
the resources of a country. Some countries have been able to master the dynamics and the 
ingredients necessary for translation of economic resources into progress and economic growth.
77
 
On the other hand, some resource-rich countries have experienced exponential challenges with 
resource leakage
78
, constant economic loss and in some instances political instability.
79
 From the 
theoretical framework herein, all sovereign mineral wealth is deemed assets of the people and are 
managed and controlled by the state as a mere trustee. 
 
In a trustee relationship, transparency in the management of trust property is key and immutable.
80
 
The absence of transparency is a precursor to mismanagement and conflict. In mineral wealth, 
therefore, the benefit derived from the mineral wealth varies from country to country. However, 
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in dictating the variable result. Such a factor is transparency.
81
 Since the state is managing the 
trust property and the people have not ceded all their power,
82
 the levels of transparency play a 
key role in maintaining the correct balance of resources and their utilisation. The other key factor 
the goes hand in hand with transparency is information disclosure and availability. In all human 
endeavours, information is a key element in decision making. The two principles of transparency 




The relationship between information access, transparency and accountability cannot be gainsaid. 
On 30 October 2001,
84
 the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was enacted to further 
democratise and liberalise access to information in environmental matters under the umbrella of 
the United Nations
85
. The convention focuses on transparency through information access and 
disclosure in order to keep governments and governmental agencies accountable and in turn 
instrumental in combating poverty, environmental degradation and systemic failures occasioned 
by opacity.
86
 Accountability in management of the extractive industry rights denotes the 
accessibility of data relating to the extractive excursions and the prudent management of the 
utilisation of resources in a transparent manner.
87
Article 5 (2) of the Convention underscored the 
nexus between transparency and information access. It provides that national legislation sanctions 
public authorities to provide environmental information which is transparent and is easily 
accessible. Further, on matters pertaining to the environment, the convention under Article 7 
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essential in keeping in line with the aim of the convention which is to further accountability and 
transparency in decision-making and to strengthen public support for decisions on environmental 
matters. The applicability of this Convention is significant in decision making on matters affecting 
the environment in licensing of oil blocks and management of hydrocarbon rights. 
 
A country’s choice or design of what model should be used to base its process of licensing of oil 
blocks is hinged on many factors. These factors include geological potential, market and economic 
potential. The end goal, however, should be a model that is able to pick the correct fit partner for 




Not all factors affecting the design of efficient allocation systems can be controlled or influenced 
by governments. They can however adapt their allocation strategies to respond to changes in the 
market and economic conditions.
89 
 
There is no model allocation policy or system appropriate for all governments and all 
circumstances.
90
 The optimal design depends on a range of factors and requires the definition of 
the objectives that policymakers aim to achieve through the allocation of petroleum E&P rights.
91
 
Some of these objectives may be more effectively achieved by combining allocation systems with 
other policy tools, in particular, the fiscal system and market regulation. Country-specific 
objectives and constraints tend to change over time, as do exogenous factors.
92
 In addition, 
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these reasons, countries often adopt a range of allocation policies, including open-door systems 
and various forms of licensing rounds.
94 
 
It is on this premise, that Kenya’s licensing of oil rights design needs to be pegged on 
comprehensive and unequivocal legislation and regulations that take into consideration the fact 
that optimisation of the design will be achieved when the design’s goal is to increase economic 
rent. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, it is common knowledge that good governance of natural resources 
translates to higher returns to the people to whom the funds belong. Governance parameters and 
ideologies however, differ across the world. Different jurisdictions have employed varying models 
with mixed results. One such governance parameter that cuts across is the concept of good 
governance, transparency and information access, disclosure and availability. A transparent system 
translates to a better governance index and revenue for the people. The absence of transparency 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 





This Chapter will deal with the domestic legal, legislative and regulatory framework and policies 
on oil block management and transparency. It will put into perspective the existing laws, rules and 
policy frameworks and the enforcement mechanisms ranging from the initial processes of oil block 
gazettement, licensing and production and the underlying concept of transparency in the 
management of these hydrocarbon rights. Analysis of the ensuing acts of parliament will also be 
dealt with. Further, it will look at the international law on oil exploration and production of oil and 
gas as well as the available framework on transparency, i.e. the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). This chapter therefore seeks to answer the question as to whether the 
discretionary powers granted to the Cabinet Secretary are inimical to transparency and 
accountability. 
 
Most oil contracts and exploration licenses were consummated under the former statutory regime. 
Ngamia 1 being the primary point of reference espoused some weaknesses and latent defects in 
the licensing system that the current Act seeks to resolve. There have been several farm-ins and 
farm-outs in Ngamia 1 with no transparent regulations. This, therefore, offers a keen focus on the 
milestones embodied or lack of it in the new dispensation and how far it entrenches transparency 
in the management of hydrocarbon rights. This chapter will, therefore, focus on the existing regime 
in the reflection of the former system and how best the lessons from Ngamia 1 have been chiselled 
to the law that was passed. 
 
3.1 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
 
3.1.1 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
 
Kenya in 2010 adopted a transformative charter ushering in a new constitutional dispensation.
95
 




Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney-General & 4 others [2013] eKLR, Paragraph 51; Samuel 
KimuchuGichuru& another v Attorney General & 3 others [2015] eKLR, Paragraph 56; Pharmaceutical Society of 
Kenya v National Assembly & 3 others [2017] eKLR, Paragraph 93; Republic v Independent Electoral and 
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further ushered in a new era in the management of natural resources and hydrocarbon rights. Under 
the Constitution, all mineral and natural resources belong to the people of Kenya and are managed 
by the state on their behalf.
96
 The state is a mere custodian of the mineral resources and manages 
them under the charter being the Constitution. Being a transformative Charter, Article 10 thereof 
provides that all state organs, state officers, public officers and all persons whenever they make or 
apply policy decisions are bound by the national values and principles of governance which 
include the participation of the people, inclusiveness, integrity, transparency and accountability.
97
 
This contemporary textual approach militates every approach to the interpretation of this supreme 
law and other laws of the land. This, therefore, forms the basis for discussion in this chapter. 
 
At the core of management in hydrocarbon rights is the requirement for ratification by parliament of 
some contracts relating to natural resources. Article 71 defines the scope of what is subject to 
ratification by parliament. This provision had however not been operationalised in the case of Mui 
Coal Basin Local Community & 15 others v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 17 
others
98
where the High Court held that even though Article 71 requires parliamentary approval of 
transactions, the same has not been operative as statute has not been enacted and therefore cannot be 
visited upon the contracting parties. With the enactment of the Mining Act, 2016, this has now been 
factored in Section 117 (5) of the Act.
99
 Concerning hydrocarbon rights, this has now been made 
mandatory under section 58 of the Petroleum Act.
100 
 
On the ownership of hydrocarbon rights, the Constitution vests all natural resources to the people 
of Kenya. Natural resources, constitutes public land under the definition of Article 260 of the 
Constitution. In Water Resources Management Authority v Krystalline Salt Limited
101
, the court 
addressed the idea of natural resources and how they vest in the people, and the fact that the state 
 
 
Boundaries Commission (I.E.B.C.) Ex parte National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others [2017] eKLR, 
Paragraph 57 
96
Tom Ojienda, ‘Land Law and Conveyancing: Principles and Practice’, LawAfrica, 2015 pg. 1 -33. 
97
Pharmaceutical Society of Kenya v National Assembly & 3 others [2017] eKLR, Paragraph 93. 
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Mui Coal Basin Local Community & 15 others v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 17 others [2015] eKLR. 
99
Mining Act, No. 12 of 2016, Section 115 (5). 
100
Petroleum Act, 2019, Section 58. 
101
Water Resources Management Authority v Krystalline Salt Limited [2018] eKLR; Ledidi Ole Tauta& Others v 
Attorney General & 2 others [2015] eKLR; Water Resources Management Authority v Kensalt Limited [2014] eKLR, 
Paragraphs 21, 36, 41, 47 and 59 and Lake Naivasha Friends of the Environment v Attorney General & 2 Others 
[2012]eKLR. 
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is a mere trustee. It therefore organically flows that such resources must be employed in a 
sustainable manner and in accordance with the will and aspirations of the Kenyan people. 
 
3.1.2 Petroleum Act, 2019 
 
By giving unchecked discretion to the cabinet secretary in charge of petroleum on licensing of oil 
and gas blocks, the Petroleum Act under section 10, 18 & 126 creates opacity which could lead to 
avenues for corruption and conflict between the community and the IOC and/or the Government 
 
The enactment of the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2017 into law 
in 2019 opens new frontiers in the management of hydrocarbon rights and seeks to align the regime 
with the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. As noted earlier, it further operationalises some muted 
provisions of the Constitution such as Article 71 which requires parliamentary ratification for 
mineral resource agreements.
102
 The striking effect on management of mineral and hydrocarbon 
rights is the entrenched safety valves, checks and balances that ensure the transparent and 
sustainable management of natural resources by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
 
The enactment of the Petroleum Act, 2019 effectively repeals the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Development) Act.
103
 This change in the operative statute calls to fore an appraisal of the new 
safeguards and achievements embodied or portended by the new legislation. This Act has a much 
wider scope as it applies to upstream, midstream and downstream activities. This new enactment 
has integrated several transparency measures and global best practice in the management of hydro 
carbon rights. The first salient feature is the establishment of National Petroleum Advisory 
Committee on an advisory role
104
. The Committee advises the Cabinet Secretary on petroleum 
contracts and recommends the revocation or cancellation of petroleum licences. 
 
On information flow, the Act empowers the Cabinet Secretary to develop regulations for operation 
and management.
105






Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Sixth Schedule, Clause 8 (3) provides that the provisions of Article 71 of the 
Constitution shall not take effect till the operative legislation is enacted. 
103
Petroleum Act, 2019, Section 128. 
104
Established under Section 12 
105
Sections 18, 126, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
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maintain data of oil exploration firms in Kenya.
106
  EPRA being the body mandated to grant a 
 
non-exclusive exploration licence, the task therefore comes in handy as it is well placed to 
 
monitor compliance. The Cabinet Secretary under section 126 is tasked with making of rules that 
 
govern data collection and dissemination. 
 
In what appears to be a restatement of constitutional provisions, the Act restates that petroleum 
 
rights belong to the people and further in abundance of caution states that explorative firms have 
no proprietary rights.
107
 This buttresses on the earlier finding that according to the Constitution 
all mineral resources belong to the people and the state manages them as a mere trustee. 
 
The Act in a classical approach to transparent reporting structure requires the Cabinet Secretary 
 
to publish a reporting framework. This seems geared towards making information accessible and 
 




From the announcement of the discovery of oil in Block 10BB in 2012 by Tullow Oil to the 
 




  An example is in the case of Africa Oil Turkana Limited (previously known as 
 




which pitted vital players in the extractive industry. At paragraph 4 of the Judgement, 
 
the court held that: 
 
“The basis on which Interstate sought those reliefs was that in the course of carrying out 
its drilling programmes in Turkana and West Pokot areas of the Rift Valley to prospect for 
water for the local communities, it (at the time it was known as Interstate Mining Co. Ltd) 
had encountered “a black substance smelling like kerosene” which it suspected “to be crude 
oil”; that it then provided the Permanent Secretary with samples of that substance in 
December 2005 with a request to carry out chemical analysis; that thereafter, it applied to 
the Permanent Secretary to be issued with a non exclusive exploration permit with a view 
to obtaining further crude samples for further chemical analysis and with a view also to 
undertaking crude reserve quantification feasibility report as a foundation for a production 




Section 22 (5), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
107
Section 14, Petroleum Act, 2019. 
108
Kennedy Mkutu and Gerard Wandera,  ‘Conflict, Security and the Extractive Industries in Turkana, Kenya: 
Emerging Issues 2012 – 2016’, United States International University & Kenya School of Government, 2016. 
109
Africa Oil Turkana Limited (previously known as Turkana Drilling Consortium Ltd) & 3 others v Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Energy & 17 others [2016] eKLR. 
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investors; that the Minister of Energy robbed it of its “God given find” in that, using 
Interstate’s samples, the Minister “deceitfully and fraudulently” expropriated and 
misappropriated its secrets and “clandestinely” issued exploration permit in respect of 
Blocks 10BA, 10BB, 11A, 11B, 12A and 13T to the interested parties.” 
 
At paragraph 5 it was further noted that: 
 
“Interstate further contended that despite having procured the requisite permits and 
authority from the County Council of Turkana and that of Pokot and having procured 
“serious and competent strategic investors with requisite financial and technical 
capabilities”, the Minister ignored or refused to respond to its letters and applications for 
exploration permit(s) in respect of Blocks 10BA, 10BB, 11A, 11B, 12A and 13T. 
According to Interstate, the Minister “fraudulently sold out the secrets and transferred the 
benefits” accruing to it to the interested parties.” 
 
This excerpt, in as far as it is merely a party’s version of the dispute before court, is instrumental 
 
in tracking the steps and the birth of vibrancy in the extractive industry in Kenya. They serve as a 
 
horrible reminder of the rigours that parties can undergo when there are no clear set 
 




With the endless search for oil within the gazetted blocks, conflicts continually arise. In Daniel 
 
Ngotiek Nchui& 3 others v National Oil Corporation of Kenya & another
110
  relating to the 
 
exploration of Block 14T in Magadi Area where the petitioner went to the Environment and 
 
Land Court at Kajiado decrying that the National Oil Corporation had trespassed their land while 
 
prospecting for oil. The underlying lesson from the analysis and determination of the court is the 
 
information asymmetry between the exploration firms and the native population who seem not 
 




Under the Petroleum Act, 2019, the award of petroleum rights will now be by competitive bidding 
before the licences can be granted.
111
 Under the Act, the Cabinet Secretary advertises the 
intention to award petroleum blocks, and the interested parties place their bids in what is known 
as a Licensing Round.
112





Daniel NgotiekNchui& 3 others v National Oil Corporation of Kenya & another [2019] eKLR 
111
Section 18 (4) (b), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
112
Section 18 (2), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
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determining the responsiveness of bids.
113
 The Cabinet Secretary can again enter into direct 
negotiation with exploration firms and award licences; the EPRA, however, retains the right to 
award a non – exclusive exploration permit.
114
 Generally, the Act has no clear procedure for 
conducting transparent bids and safeguards of ensuring the rights of bidders are protected. The 
absence of such a procedure leaves much to speculation hence falling short of international best 
practice in the management of hydrocarbon rights. The information data centre is a noble idea but 
there is no procedure to be followed in obtaining such information held thus leaving much to be 
governed by the Access to Information Act, 2016. The legislature therefore failed to appreciate the 
uniqueness and the novelty of information on oil and gas and the previous history of secrecy and 
inaccessibility of such information and therefore the need to further safeguard the right to 
information access. 
 
The Act further covers the concepts of surrender on oil blocks and, the attendant rights and 
obligations that ensue under that surrender. The surrender is also intricately intertwined with 
decommissioning as players seeking to surrender a specific oil block must provide the Cabinet 
Secretary with a decommissioning plan. The liabilities for acts done by the player during the 
pendency of the licence are also taken into account. 
 
3.1.3 Energy Act, 2019 
 
As espoused above, this Act now regulates midstream and downstream petroleum.
115
 It effectively 
repeals the Energy Act, 2006. The Act establishes the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal under 
Section 25 which has original civil jurisdiction over matters arising from bidding rounds carried 
under the Upstream Petroleum Law. This means that as soon as the bidding rounds open, any party 
aggrieved by the process will be subjected to appeal to the tribunal. 
 
The Act further establishes under Section 9, the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority which 
is a body corporate with the mandate and functions outlined under section 10 which are to regulate, 
monitor and supervise upstream petroleum operations in accordance with the Petroleum Act, 2019; 






Section 18 (3), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
114
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collect, manage and maintain upstream petroleum data and among others receive, review and grant 
applications for non - exclusive exploration permits. 
 
However, this Act suffers the same fate as it fails to provide the parameters that guide dispute 
resolution thus leaving the tribunal with much discretion. The absence of a bidding procedure 
coupled with the discretion the tribunal enjoys hampers the development of the critical 
jurisprudence on bidding. This is especially the case where information is not available thus 
leaving the Tribunal as a sanitiser of ministerial fiat therefore falling short of transparency and 
global standards that advocate for development of administrative parameters. 
 
3.1.4 Environmental Management Coordination Act, 1998 
 
One of the globally recognised best standards in the management of hydrocarbon rights is the 
protection of the environment. Key jurisdictions that proffer global benchmarks incorporate 
environmentally conscious safeguards in the process of licensing and grant of petroleum 
exploration rights to extractive firms. Quintessentially, the Environmental Management 
Coordination Act, 1998 is the law applicable concerning safeguarding environmental concerns. 
 
The Petroleum Act, 2019 under section 59 provides for the application and grant of a production 
licence. As a prerequisite for the grant of the licence, the extractive firm must submit an 
Environmental Impact Assessment report.
116
After an explorative excursion, decommissioning 
ensues as under Section 69 of the Petroleum Act, 2019 which provides that environmental concerns 
must be handled during decommissioning and further take into account the environment and 
natural resources in that particular area.
117
 Part VIII of the Petroleum Act, 2019 also provides for 
environmental and health safety which must be carried on by the contractor in tandem with the 
provisions of the Environmental Management Coordination Act, 1998. The model production 
agreement under the Petroleum Act, 2019 further provides that upon being licensed, the contractor 
shall adhere to the provisions of the Environmental Management Coordination Act, 1998. 
 
It is important to note that the Act herein was enacted as the first environmental statute in Kenya. 
 
As a result, much has developed and amendments to cure the inadequacies have been witnessed.  
 
116
Section 59 (c) (g), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
117
Section 70 (1) (c), Petroleum Act, 2019. 
 
Page | 28 
Nandako Sheila Student No. 110361 
 
An obvious flaw however is the conflict resolution in matters relating to oil explorative forms and 
the impact on the environment and the host population. This needs to be harmonised so as to avoid 
jurisdiction clash between the Tribunals established under the Energy and Environment Acts. 
 
3.1.5 Government Contracts Act, 1952 
 
This Act provides for the making of contracts on behalf of the Government and trivial matters.
118
It 
aimed to provide for authority and manner of binding the government. The Act was enacted during 
the colonial era and has not been reviewed to ensure that it is in tandem with the rest of the laws.
119
 
This has in turn been noted and an amendment initiated through the Government Contracts Bill, 
2018 which embodies the constitutional principles of transparency, accountability, public 
participation and the values and principles under article 10 of the Constitution. The bill further 
expands the scope by incorporating anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws as well as making 
provisions for contract security to cushion the taxpayer in instances where the contract is not 
performed as well as binding County Governments. 
 
3.1.6 Access to Information Act, 2016 
 
As earlier stated in this thesis, information is the manure of a flourishing democracy. The preamble 
provision of the Act renders itself to easy deciphering over its intent and purpose. The Act is 
primarily a brainchild of Article 35 of the Constitution aimed at operationalising the Act and 
conferring on the Commission on Administrative Justice the oversight and enforcement functions 
and powers of the right of access to information. In Peter Makau Musyoka& 19 others (Suing on 
their own behalf and on behalf of the Mui Coal Basin Local Community) v Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Energy & 14 others (Mui Case) the court held that access to information is a crucial 
component in transparency and management of collective rights.
120
 Courts have in various other 
fora held that public participation is of no use/consequence unless information necessary for such 





Government Contracts Act, Cap 25. 
119
Office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice, The Government Contracts Act, 
<https://www.statelaw.go.ke/1097-2/> on 6
th
 April, 2019.  
120
Peter Makau Musyoka& 19 others (Suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the Mui Coal Basin Local 
Community) v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 14 others [2014] eKLR  
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Nairobi Law Monthly Company v Kenya Electricity Generation Company & 2 Others [2013] eKLR. 
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In the oil extractive sector, the award of the famous Ngamia I (Block 10BB) before the discovery 
of oil was not known. The communities severally decried of the secrecy of the project and lack of 
information.
122
 Buttressing the philosophical foundation that natural resources are trust property, 
it has also been postulated that information, especially on collective natural resources and such 
information, is held in trust by the state and the people who are the owners of the information have 
a right to access the information held in their trust.
123
 Further, as alluded to earlier in this paper, 
Cordaid baseline report postulated that the difficulty in accessing information intelligible to the 
locals of the affected community propagated the mystery in management of hydrocarbon rights.
124
 
This information asymmetry breeds corruption and clouds the process. Since the affected 
community cannot access information affecting them, the actors in the industry take advantage of 
this and in turn disenfranchise the locals of their rights including compensation for the use of their 
land or in instances where they are affected by the activities of extractive firms. A case closer to 
the scenario herein is a case in Kitui County where the information asymmetry between the locals 
and the actors in the industry led to cases of corruption and extortion in areas where the Kenya 
Electricity Transmission Company Limited (KETRACO) was seeking to compensate natives for 
the grant of a wayleave corridor.
125 
 
The Access to Information Act, which is the operative law giving effect to the provisions of Article 
35 of the Constitution, envisages the office of the Ombudsman as the custodian of the right. 
However as the African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL) postulate, it is not merely 













Peter Gathu and Henry Kahindi, Access to Information in Kenya, Adili – Transparency International Kenya 
(October/November, 2015) Issue No. 155: Access to information is fundamental in a society that is governed by the 
rule of law. For the reason that governments hold information in trust in behalf of citizens, it follows that citizens have 
the right of access to the information held by the State. Access to timely and accurate information provides individuals 
with the knowledge required to participate effectively in the democratic processes in any democratic society. Access 
to information fosters openness and transparency in decision-making.  
124
Cordaid Kenya, Oil Exploration in Kenya: Success Requires Consultation - Assessment of Community Perceptions 
of Oil Exploration in Turkana County, Kenya (Report) August, 2015, 22.  
125
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Corruption Commission Act, 2011. 
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verified, accurate and above all not distorted or skewed as to mislead or misinform. 
126
From a 
historical perspective, the right to information as a constitutionally guaranteed right has developed 
exponentially. The Repealed Constitution guaranteed the right under section 79 but at the same 
time clawed back the right by limiting it on the grounds of public health and national security or 
safety.
127
 Under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, there is a centralised limitation clause under 





prohibits any person from obtaining and transmitting any information that 
in the opinion of the State, is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly 
useful for a foreign power or disaffected person.
130
 This prohibition and limitation has however 
proven to be shaky and its justification withered by the advent of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
as was demonstrated in the case of Boniface Mwangi v Inspector General of Police &5 others
131
 
which espoused stringent safeguards and the respect for the rule of law. It demonstrated a departure 
from the previous anecdotes that “national security” was whipped out to tramp on any right. 
 
In a pragmatic approach, the interpretation of Article 35 on the right to information has been 
classified into two as was demonstrated in the case of Mohamed Ali Baadi and others v Attorney 
General & 11 others
132
 where the court held that the right to information constitutes both an 
‘active’ and a ‘passive’ concept. A “passive” aspect includes the right of the public to seek from 
public authorities, and the obligation of public authorities to provide information in response to a 
request while an “active” aspect includes the right of the public to receive information and the 
obligation of authorities to collect and disseminate knowledge of public interest without the need 
for a specific request. 
 
The approach espoused herein is that even though there was partial compliance in the disclosure of the 




 African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL), Towards Promoting Access to Information in Kenya, 
University of Cape Town, April, 2011, 4. 
127
Section 79(2) of the former Constitution of Kenya. 
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 Ed, 2012) p. 175. 
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Official Secrets Act, Cap, 187. 
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the partial agreement. Bringing this approach to the Ngamia 1 case study and the award of Block 
10BB to Tullow Oil posits the question of whether the same would have met the threshold set in 
the LAPSSET Project Case. This contrast serves as a reminder to government agencies that the 
right to information is a broadened aspect under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The 
establishment of the National Data Centre where petroleum data is to be centrally stored and 
analysed as per the dictated of the Petroleum Act, 2019 is a positive gesture towards realising the 
right and its adherence thereof. 
 
3.2 International Legal Framework 
 
 
3.2.1 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a non-binding concept considered as a 
global best practice that calls for extractive industries to report their payments to the governments 
of the countries where they operate. At the same time, governments have to disclose their receipts. 
The information is then reconciled and made public. The EITI is voluntary, but once a signatory, 
its requirements are binding. In 2003, the Civil Society Organisations in conjunction with 
International Extractive Corporations and investors both in developed and developing nations 
formed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative majorly to tackle the ‘resource curse’ 
problem.
133
 This initiative requires all extractive companies operating within a nation’s territory 
to disclose resource related payments made to the government. The government is, in turn, required 
to publish what it receives. These figures are then reconciled by an independent body drawing its 
membership from all sectors of the governance structure of a country’s extractive industry. This 
form the crux of contract transparency and governance from the licensing of oil blocks to 
production contracts. 
 
Nations keen on improving accountability and ensuring that the mineral resources are managed in 
line with the best global practices are encouraged to ascribe to the initiative. For example, Ghana 
is a budding player and an oil resource-rich nation with the discovery of Jubilee fields and have 
joined the ranks of countries that have ascribed to this initiative.
134




Patrícia Galvão Ferreira, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Using a Global Public--‐Private 
Partnership to Facilitate Domestic Governance  
134
See: The global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources: Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) available at <https://eiti.org/who-we-are> accessed on 20th December, 2018. 
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2019 defines the industry’s best practices under section 2, and its application under the Act is 
cross-cutting from the decision of the Cabinet Secretary to compliance with environmental and 
safety standards. This incorporation of the best practices into the primary law governing upstream 
petroleum is, therefore, a positive step in steering the transparency initiative. 
 
3.2.2 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation, 1990 
 
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides that any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall 
form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.
135
Kenya has ratified the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990. This is an 
international maritime convention establishing measures for dealing with marine oil pollution 
incidents nationally and in co-operation with other countries. The convention addresses the human 
environment in general and marine environment in particular. This is instrumental in addressing 
offshore oil rigs and exploration and protection of the marine environment which is res nullius 
136
 
and preserving the common heritage of humanity. 
 
3.2.3 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, 25
th
 June 1998 
 
 
The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters has not only been instrumental in environmental 
realms but has sparked off discussions in management of hydrocarbon rights. 
 
As espoused by Article I of the Aarhus Convention, Public Participation has not been expressly 
defined by the convention, however, there are parameters and key pointers on what public 
participation entails. Article 6 (3) of the Convention provides that participation procedures shall 
include reasonable time-frames for the different phases, allowing sufficient time for informing the 
public in accordance with paragraph 2 above and for the public to prepare and participate 
effectively during environmental decision-making. The Convention under Article 6 (4) advocates 




Article 2 (6) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
136
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Water Resources Management Authority v Krystalline Salt Limited [2018] eKLR. 
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The procedure for public participation is provided for under Article (7) which provides that: 
‘Procedures for public participation shall allow the public to submit, in writing or, as appropriate, 
at a public hearing or inquiry with the applicant, any comments, information, analyses or opinions 
that it considers relevant to the proposed activity.’ It is worth noting the fact that the Convention 
places much premium on access to information which as alluded earlier is key in decision making 
and in making public participation a meaningful exercise.
137 
 
Although Kenya is not a signatory to this convention, the guidelines thereon on public participation 
and access to information have been embraced in a doctrinal way for instance in Mohamed Ali 
Baadi and others v Attorney General & 11 others
138 
 
3.3 Other Legal and Policy Framework 
 
 
3.3.1 Vision 2030 
 
The premium placed on the extractive industry in Vision 2030 is a testament of the immense 
potential it has towards the growth of a country’s economy. The blueprint provides for the 
country’s development trajectory from the year 2008 – 2030. It is based on three “pillars”; the 
economic pillar, the social pillar and the political pillar. One of the economic pillars is the energy 
sector which still contributes to the high cost of production. The Energy sector by extension 
includes upstream petroleum. 
 
3.3.3 National Petroleum Policy 
 
With the enactment of the Petroleum Act, 2019 there is now a requirement that the Cabinet 
Secretary comes up with a petroleum policy on the advice of the National Upstream Petroleum 
Advisory Committee. Once formulated, it will guide the petroleum industry and inform decision 
making. The policy should in light of the findings of this chapter embody transparency and 
accountability with proper checks and balances in line with the principles of governance and access 
to information. In effect the policy should be geared at benefiting Kenyans by realising the best of 
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Comparative Analysis of Niger Delta-case of Famfa Oil Limited on Licensing and 






Nigeria has the largest natural gas reserve in Africa, and the second largest oil reserve in Africa.
139
 
By contrast, however, the wealth and oil resource has turned out to be a cause for disharmony and 
environmental concerns.
140
 Nigeria, therefore, offers an ideal case study or comparison on the 
management of oil blocks. The case study chosen herein is a perfect blend of legal and systemic 
flaws that have cost the Nations of Nigeria loss of revenue it is entitled to lift from Famfa Oil 
Limited exploration of Oil Mining License OML 127. This is further bolstered by the fact that 
Nigeria has faced challenges with transparency as espoused in the case study of Famfa Oil and has 
proved a notorious case study on transparency in Africa. The oil industry dominates the Nigerian 
economy and accounts for more than 90 per centum of its exports, 25 per centum of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and 80 per centum of its total government revenues.
141
 Thus, the Famfa 
Case offers an ideal case and a benchmark for testing legal and administrative flaws in Africa. 
 
The case involving Famfa Oil Limited began with the award of OPL 216 under the then Nigerian 
Military ruler General Ibrahim Babangida.
142
The Agbami Field is one of the largest oil-rich deep-
water reserves in Nigeria.
143






Adati Ayuba Kadafa, Oil Exploration and Spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Civil and Environmental 
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140
Joseph C. Ebegbulem, Oil Exploration and Poverty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Critical Analysis, 
International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 4 No. 3; March 2013.  
141
Gunu Umar and Kilishi, A. Abdulhakeem, Oil Price Shocks and the Nigeria Economy: A Variance Autoregressive 
(VAR) Model, International Journal of Business and Management , Vol. 5, No. 8; August 2010. 
142
Odion Omonfoman, Folorunsho Alakija’s Oil Block: Model of Nigerian Elite Racketeering?, Punch, March 14, 
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Prospecting Licence (OPL) to an Oil Mining Licence (OML) and the rule of law.
144
 The 
circumstances under which Alakija Folorunsho acquired OPL 216 is what has been termed as an 
elitist perspective where “Nigerian elite “hijacked” oil resource in the region in the name of 
“national cake” to the exclusion of the resource bearing communities.”
145
 That perspective 
notwithstanding, the case brought to fore the critical aspect in any oil-rich nation, management of 
oil blocks and hydrocarbon rights. 
 
The case pitted Famfa Limited against the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and was litigated virtually across the judicial hierarchy 
to its final determination in the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The country has always grappled with 
transparency which seems to have eluded it especially through its formative years under military 
dictatorship.
146
 The Famfa Case, however, serves two key lessons. It is a reminder of the 
consequences of lack of transparency and the challenges associated with it. On the other hand, it 
is a testament of tenacity and the rule of law, that when legislature lays down rules that guide 
society,
147
 the same must be followed, and the implementers must pay attention to what is laid 
down and cannot arbitrarily deprive a party of a right, even for a noble course by ignoring the laid 
down procedure for the safeguard of liberties and the rule of law.
148 
 
Generally, there was general discontent over the opacity and the circumstances in which a single 
person acquired the rights over one of Nigeria’s most lucrative oil blocks.
149
 This opacity, whether 
perceived or real, is what the government sought to claw back by compulsorily acquiring fifty per 
centum of Famfa Oil Limited. This offers an ideal case study on the management of hydrocarbon 
blocks and both the latent and the patent pitfalls that relate to it. 
 
Thus, the chapter will seek to mirror the structural and legal pitfalls identified in chapter three 
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will therefore seek to patch the misgivings identified with the success stories of other jurisdictions 
like Ghana. On the other hand, the failures of other civilisation like Nigeria will act as a reminder 
of the effect of governance flaws and act as beacons against such structural or governance flaws. 
 
4.1 History of Famfa Oil Limited 
 
 
Famfa Oil Limited was incorporated in 1991 by Alakija Folorunsho, a Nigerian fashion icon.
150
 
In May 1993, Alakija Folorunsho applied for an allocation for an Oil Prospecting License 
(OPL).
151
 The OPL 216 was a leasehold license over the block.
152
 She got the license/leasehold 
rights to explore for crude oil deposits on a 617,000-acre block (now called the Oil Prospecting 
License 216)
153
 on the 10th of August, 1993 through her company Famfa Oil Limited.
154 
 
Famfa Oil Limited is considered an indigenous license holder as opposed to other players in the 
Nigerian case that are multinational or foreign.
155
 Upon the grant of the license, the Company 
with a vision of being a leading indigenous oil and gas company embarked on oil exploration and 
soon struck oil in the block now known as Agbami fields.
156




Usman, Adamu Kyuka, ‘Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Laws: Policies, and Institutions’, Malthouse Press Limited, 
2017.  
151
Awoko Newspaper, Sierra Leone Business: From Fashion Designer to Oil Magnate: How billionaire Folorunsho 
Alakija replaced Oprah Winfrey as World's Richest Black Woman, Wed April 10, 2019 
at<https://awoko.org/2017/04/10/sierra-leone-business-from-fashion-designer-to-oil-magnate-how-billionaire-
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th
 April, 2019: In May 1993, Folorunsho applied for the allocation of 
an oil prospecting license (OPL). The license to explore for oil on a 617,000- acre block—now referred to as OPL 
216—was granted to Alakija’s company, Famfa Limited. The block is located approximately 220 miles south east of 
Lagos and 70 miles offshore of Nigeria in the Agbami Field of the central Niger Delta (Marie-Therese Phido et al, A 
Future Beyond Oil (Women in Oil and Gas) Boundless, Volume 5).  
152
Usman, Adamu Kyuka, ‘Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Laws: Policies, and Institutions’, Malthouse Press Limited, 
2017.  
153
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th
 April, 2019.  
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Industry, Global Journal of engineering research VOL 11, NO. 2, 2012: 123-131; IlanBijaoui, Multinational Interest 
& Development in Africa; Establishing a People’s Economy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017; Odu, Peter, The Effect of 
Teleworking System on Employees’ Performance in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Upstream Sector, Peter, Apeejay-
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Famfa Oil Limited had to convert its prospecting license OPL 216 to a mining license OML 
127.
157
 Upon the conversion, Famfa could proceed and mine oil in the field.
158
 Upon being 
granted the leasehold rights to the block vide OPL 216 and having explored the fields, in 1996, 
Famfa Oil Limited signed a farm-in agreement with Star Deepwater Petroleum Limited which was 
a subsidiary of Chevron Texaco.
159
 Star Deepwater Petroleum Limited was the technical advisor 
for the block. Later in 1998, Twenty (20) per centum of Star Deepwater Petroleum Limited interest 
in the block was assigned to Petroleo Brasileiro Nigeria Limited.
160
 In March 2000, the Nigerian 
Government acquired an interest in the oil field sparking the legal battle under analysis herein. 
 
4.2 Allocation of Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL - 216) to Famfa Oil Limited – Agbami Field 
 
 
Generally, there are doubts as to the adequacy and content of the plethora of legislations with particular 
reference to the acquisition of oil rights for exploration, prospection and mining in Nigeria.’
161
 As 
earlier mentioned, the licence to explore OPL 216 was originally granted to Famfa Oil Limited.
162
 It 
is alleged that in the year 1993 under the military regime many oil exploration licences were awarded 
to people who then simply handed them over to multinational companies with the necessary technical 
expertise to prospect for oil.
163
 Famfa Oil didn’t have the necessary technical expertise to prospect and 










Ayeni G. O, The Agbami Field, Blocks OPL 216 and 217, Niger Delta (200202549) University of Leeds 
158
Agbami Field is located between latitude 3
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 30’N and 3 
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south-east of Lagos and 70 miles offshore Nigeria, in the central Niger Delta.  
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Petroleum Economist, Nigeria: Output lifted by Agbami start-up <https://www.petroleum-
economist.com/articles/markets/trends/2008/nigeria-output-lifted-by-agbami-start-up> 16
th
 April, 2019. 
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 The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 1 Tower view Drive, Durham, NC 27705, USA. 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Cases/index.htm  
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for Oil Exploration, Prospection and Mining in Nigeria, Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy, Vol.5, No.9, 
2015. 
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ceding forty (40) per centum of the Famfa Oil to Star Deep Water Petroleum Limited. In the year 
2000, it was confirmed that the block had more than one billion barrels of oil.
164 
 
A licensee under an OPL has an exclusive right (a) to search for, (b) to drill, (c) to extract samples, 
(d) to export crude oil, and (e) to refine in Nigeria.
165
 The grant under an OPL is limited as opposed 
to that under the OML which takes that nature of a lease and the accompanying exclusive rights. 
The grant of OPL 216 to Famfa oil was perceived as opaque because there was no requirement for 
an open tender bidding or a competitive process as it is the practice in many jurisdictions today. 
When OPL 216 was granted to Famfa Oil Limited it is doubtable whether the requirement as it is 
in place today pursuant to the Petroleum Act, 1969 and the Petroleum Regulations enacted 
thereunder were being implemented as it requires the person/company applying for an OPL to give 
demonstrable evidence of knowledge in oil prospecting and the requisite financial muscle to 
implement the licence granted. In that regard, the allocation of OPL 216 to Famfa Oil Limited and 
other allocations done in 1993 are seen as opaque and were done under unclear circumstances.
166 
 
Famfa Oil’s woes began while it was still the holder of OPL 216 when the President and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria directed that Government acquire 40% 
participating interest in OPL 216 allocated to Famfa Oil Limited, in accordance with the provisions 
of Paragraph 35 of the First Schedule to the Petroleum Act; and section 44(1) of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
167
Famfa Oil battled the move to acquire its stake compulsorily 










N.N.P.C. V. Famfa Oil Ltd&ANOR (SC 178/2008)[2009] NGSC 7 (Supreme Court) court stated that Agbami Oil 
field has current crude oil production capacity of two hundred thousand (200,000) barrels per day which translates to 
daily gross earnings of about US$20 million at current crude oil price of US$124.00 per barrel.  
165
Petroleum Act, 1969 (Nigeria); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD/CALAG African 
Oil and Gas Services Sector Survey Volume 1 – Nigeria; Creating Local Linkages By Empowering Indigenous 
Entrepreneurs, Geneva and New York, 2006.  
166
The Procedure for Oil Prospecting License in Nigeria, <https://resolutionlawng.com/the-procedure-for-oil-
prospecting-license-in-nigeria/> on 14
th
 April, 2019. 
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Famfa Oil Limited v. Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation &anor, (2007) 12 iLAW/CA/A/173/06. 
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4.3 Conversion of Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL – 216) to Oil Mining Licence (OML – 127) 
 
 
In 2003, Famfa applied for a conversion from an OPL to an OML, and in 2004 the request was 
granted. OPL 216 became OML 127.
168
 Famfa Oil, therefore, began extracting oil from OML 127 
and currently has a concession licence expiring in 2024.
169
 An OML is like a mineral lease (which 
does not involve an estate in the land) but which permits the lessee the use of the land to explore 
and dispose of any petroleum discovered within the leased area for a limited time.
170
 The Nigerian 
government after renewing the lease in favour of Famfa Oil in 2004, again in 2005, through the 
Department of Petroleum Resources wrote to Famfa Oil informing it that it intended to acquire 5/6 
of the Appellant’s interest in OML 127. Not long after, the Department of Petroleum Resources 
again on 19th of April, 2005 wrote another letter to the Appellant, this time acquiring 50% of the 
Appellant’s interest in OML 127.
171
 This sparked a legal dispute over the government’s 
acquisition of 50% of OML 127. 
 
4.4 Acquisition of 50% stake of Famfa’s Oil Mining Licence (OML – 127) by the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
 
The genesis of the dispute between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Famfa Oil 
Limited has its origin in the decision of the former to claw back fifty per centum (50%) of the sixty per 
centum (60%) shareholding held by Folorunsho Alakija which saw her take the corporation through 
the courts resting with the determination of the Supreme Court in her favour in 2012.
172
 The final 
determination of the Supreme Court in 2012, in NNPC v Famfa revolved on an administrative law 
issue, that is; “whether the Nigerian Minister of Petroleum can disregard the provisions of a principal 
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where the principal legislation conflicts with the provisions of a subsidiary/secondary relation 
made by the Minister under the powers conferred by the federal legislation?”
173 
 
The basis was laid at the appellate court when it observed that as per paragraph 35 of the 
 
Petroleum Act Cap 10 LFN 2004 negotiations into the government’s participation should have 
 
taken place at the application level and not when the application has already been granted. Since 
 
the government had processed the application of conversion of OPL 216 to OML 127 by the 
 
Famfa Oil, government made no effort to call upon Famfa Oil to negotiate. It went ahead to 
 
approve the conversion. The government was therefore at fault and could therefore not purport to 
compulsorily acquire in circumstances where it had not negotiated with the licensee.
174
This 
scenario serves to demonstrate that even though there are laws to which the government may 
 
employ to ensure the maximum benefit from the depletion of its natural resources if they are not 
 
implemented properly, parties can circumvent them without being said to be on the wrong. The 
 
weak link herein was in implementation. 
 
 
4.5Controversy over the “back –in the rule” (BIR) 
 
 
The original intention of the “back – in – rule” has been termed as an attempt by the subsequent 
 
civilian government to “claw back” what the military regime had given out un-procedurally. The 
 
regulations  that  the  government  was  relying  on  were  contained  in  the  Deep  Water  Block 
 
Allocations to Companies (Back-in-Rights) Regulations 2003. The Supreme Court in breaking 
 
down the issue in paragraph 11 stated that: 
 
“The clear intention of the legislature is that negotiations should take place between the 
Minister of Petroleum and the applicant of the OML. The reasoning of the legislature is 
that the Minister while negotiating must take into account the huge sums of money spent 
by the applicant drilling for oil, and ensure that 50% stake of the Federal Government in 
the OML is well taken care of in terms acceptable to the Government. The question to be 







Theophilus Olusegun Obayemi,, A Critique of the Sanctity of Oil Prospecting Licenses (“OPL”) and Oil Mining 
Leases (“OML”) in Nigeria: Within the Context of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) v. Famfa Oil  




 April, 2019. 
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The Supreme Court (Rhodes-Vivour) in delving into the administrative issue stated that the 
 
subsidiary regulation which was the basis for the “back-in-rights” owed its legitimacy to the 
 




Thus he stated: 
 
The Back-in-Right Regulation 2003 is subsidiary legislation promulgated by the Minister 
under Section 9 (a) and (h) of the Petroleum Act. The Petroleum Act is substantive or 
Principal Law. It is the principal law that provides subsidiary legislation with the source 
of its existence. Without Principal Law, there can be no subsidiary legislation, and so 
subsidiary legislation must conform with the principal law. The Petroleum Act is principal 
law, a statute. Where it prescribes a particular method of exercising statutory power, the 
procedure so laid down must be followed without any deviation whatsoever. If any 
provision of the Regulations are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act/Statute  
the provisions of the Regulation shall to the extent of the inconsistency be declared void.
177 
 
Back in  rights however are not unique to Nigeria and have been  experienced in  other 
 




  and Oklahoma.
179
  This, therefore, demonstrates that the ‘back-in-rights” though noble 
 
to ensure that the state gets the maximum benefit from the resources, in the Famfa Oil scenario, 
 
the omission by the government proved a double-edged sword from the legal perspective acting 
 
as a testament of the Court’s fidelity to the law and on the contrast, the costly implication of a 
 





4.6 Management of Oil Blocks and the Rule of Law in Nigeria 
 
 
In a nutshell, in NNPC v Famfa Oil Ltd 
180
the Supreme Court held that provisions of paragraph 2 
 
of Deep Water Block Allocation to Companies (Back-in-Rights) Regulations 2003 (a subsidiary 
 




See F.G.N v. Zebra Energy Ltd. (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) p. 162; Ogulaji v. A.G. Rivers State (1997) 6 NWLR 
(Pt. 508) p. 209; UNTHMB v. Nnoli (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 363) p. 376. 
177
NNPC v Famfa Oil, (2012) C.L.R. 5(a)(SC) at p. 36. 
178
Mengden v. Peninsula Prod Co., 544 S.W.2d 643-44 (Tex. 1976), the court held that a "back-in right" is also a 
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recovered specified costs from production.  
179
McDonald v. HUMPHRIES, 1990 OK 51 (Okla. 1990) held that the import of back in rights was to first allow the 
licensee to recoup the amount spent in the exploration.  
180
(2012)17 NWLR (pt. 1328) 148. 
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acquire five-sixth of an OPL or OML interest is invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
paragraph 35 of First Schedule to the Petroleum Act which stipulates that such participation or 
acquisition must be made on terms to be negotiated between the Federal Government and the 
holder of the OPL or OML.
181
 As earlier espoused, this was a procedural flaw. The government 
renewed Famfa Oil’s licence (OML Licence) without negotiating the terms of the acquisition. The 
attempt to later compulsorily acquire the licence on the face of the glaring omission raises several 
administrative issues and the concept of the rule of law. 
 
The Nigerian Constitution under Section 44 provides that: “the entire property in and control of 
all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon 
the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of 
the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly.”
182
 Being the supreme law governing all persons and all governmental action, it 
donated power to the legislature to enact laws to regulate the oil sector in Nigeria. As a result, the 
Petroleum Act was passed and under it the Deep Water Block Allocations to Companies (Back-in-
Rights) Regulations 2003. 
 
Today, Nigeria allots oil blocks by way of bidding rounds or direct negotiation with the Minister. 
This has been faulted due to lack of its transparency as it still reserves arbitrary powers for the 
minister. This model demonstrates that the Famfa Oil scenario that took place in 1993 widely 
viewed as irregular has not abated and continues being a constant threat to transparency. The case, 
however, serves as a reminder to government agencies on the need to put in safeguards to avoid 





The case study herein serves as a testament to two main concepts in management of hydrocarbon 
rights. The first is the need for transparency in the method and procedure of allocating and 
awarding hydrocarbon blocks. The Famfa case study shows that the allocation of the license to 





C. J. S. Azoro, National Participation in Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: Prospects and Challenges, Petroleum 
Technology Development Journal (ISSN 1595-9104): An International Journal; January 2016 - Vol. 6 No. 1, 91.  
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thwarted the subsequent attempt by the government to acquire rights in Famfa in the negotiation 
for the “back in rights”. That omission serves as a horrible reminder to government agencies on 
the need for vigilance and watertight safeguard in management of hydrocarbon rights. The 
likelihood of opacity identified by the concentration of powers on the Cabinet Secretary in charge 
of petroleum, mirrored against this case study shows the potential for abuse. 
 
 
4.8 Other Notable Global Best Practice Benchmarks and Comparative Analysis of Key 





The Nigerian Famfa oil case illustrates the concept of transparency in the management of 
hydrocarbon blocks and the effects when it falls short
183
. To further appreciate the importance of 
transparency, it is important to look at other global comparators and best practices espoused in 
other civilizations
184
. This will serve as a yardstick in auditing the Kenyan legal and policy 
framework and mirroring it against some of the time-tested practices in other traditions and in turn 
evaluate the viability of the new Kenya’s legal framework in realizing the potential and translating 
mineral wealth to economic growth. 
 
Having a transparent licensing regime on oil and gas blocks can help a country avoid avenues of 
corruption and conflict between the community and the IOC and/or the Government 
 
This sub-topic on comparative analysis will look at the best global practice in the Republic of 
Ghana. The jurisdiction has been chosen mainly because the law as it is in Kenya today has 
substantial similarity to that of the United Kingdom and therefore an easy comparator as the United 
Kingdom is considered advanced in the hydrocarbon realm. Furthermore, the United Kingdom is 
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within the European Economic area after Norway
185
. Kenya therefore, being a budding and 
potential oil-producing nation, has a lot to learn from the United Kingdom as it lays down the legal 
framework for licensing and management of hydrocarbon blocks. 
 
Ghana, on the other hand, has taken over the British standard and customised it to fit its sector. It 
is one of the few African countries credited with entrenching transparency initiatives in its 
extractives sector and further offering an ideal case study where transparency has facilitated access 
to data in therefore contributing to accountability by the government and the extractive companies. 
Ideal case studies demonstrate the importance of transparency in sealing revenue leaks and 
pointing out administrative flaws in hydrocarbon rights. 
 
 
4.8.3 Republic of Ghana 
 
 
Ghana is one of the African countries that have entrenched transparency and publicly availed oil 
contracts to the public.
186
 The law in Ghana requires a public register to be maintained on 
petroleum agreements, permits and authorisations.
187
 This entrenched transparency has led to 
public interest and accountability groups calling for accountability for revenue generated and has 
developed a model for African nations.
188
 This has been crucial in taming corruption and 
entrenching transparency and accountability by providing level ground for transparency advocacy 
and other avenues i.e. investigative journalism.
189 
 
Just like Kenya and the United Kingdom, all minerals in Ghana belong to the people of Ghana and 
vest in the president in trust for them.
190
 The Republic of Ghana is further divided into oil 
blocks/basins that are available for allocation to exploration firms.
191
 Ghana is a member of the 
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Page | 45 
Nandako Sheila Student No. 110361 
 
government, extractive companies, international agencies and NGO’s to work together to develop 
a framework to promote transparency of payments in the extractive industries.
192
 These 
developments have led Ghana to the arena where it is regarded as a key player in the transparency 
initiative in the extractives sector. 
 
Ghana’s extractive sector dates back to the 1980s when the Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation Act, 1983 was enacted. The Act established the National Petroleum Corporation to 
champion and undertake upstream petroleum exploration and development.
193
The Petroleum 
Income Tax Law1987 (PNDCL 188) was further passed to regulate taxation in the upstream 
hydrocarbon sector.
194
 With the oil boom characterised by the discovery of commercially viable 
oil deposits in 2009, the Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821) was enacted to create the 
Petroleum Commission as an independent regulator in the upstream sector in accordance with the 
1992 Constitution. What followed thereafter were a couple of legislations to modernise its 
regulatory framework. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) was enacted to 
lay the framework for management of oil revenues, and the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act, 2016 (Act 919) (the E&P Act) was also enacted to replace the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 (PNDCL 84) which was the primary legislation within 
the Ghanaian upstream oil sector. 
 
In licensing of hydrocarbon blocks to explorative firms, the Ghanaian system has adopted a hybrid 
system whereby the licence is given to the corporation that is most technically fit and also one that 
has proved that it can meet the safety and environmental standards. The Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) further establishes the Public Interest and Accountability 
Committee (PIAC) to ensure transparency and compliance with accountability in managing oil 











 See: The global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources: Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) available at <https://eiti.org/who-we-are> accessed on 20th December, 2018. 
193
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 (PNDCL 64), Sections 1, 2.  
194
Petroleum Income Tax Law 1987 (PNDCL 188) – enacted pursuant to the provisions of the Provisional National 
Defense Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981. 
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4.8.4 Transparency Measures in Management of Hydrocarbon Blocks 
 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 (Act 919) is the primary Ghanaian statute 
governing the licensing of hydrocarbon blocks in Ghana.
195
 The Act, like the United Kingdom 
standard, empowers the Minister to develop regulations on safe construction, health and safety, 
product standard, reference maps for oil blocks, competitive bidding and terms and conditions of 
petroleum agreements. Section 10 (3) provides that a petroleum licence is granted only after a fair 
competitive process. 
 
The award of hydrocarbon blocks is further regulated and guided by the Local Content and Local 
Participation Policy in Petroleum Activities which is a policy framework requiring operators, 
when advertising employment, to give preference to Ghanaians who have the requisite 
qualification, competence and experience, in all operations, including the award of oil blocks, oil 
field licenses, drilling, oil-lifting licences, aviation, transportation, and catering.
196
 This is crucial 
in ensuring that the local populace feel that they are part of the system in turn promoting 
transparency in licencing of oil blocks. Ghana is one of the few African countries known to 
disclose its contracts on hydrocarbon blocks and explorative excursions and it has consequently 
ranked higher in the Resource Governance Index (RGI).
197 
 
Historically, just like Kenya, exploration licences and licensing of hydrocarbon blocks in Ghana 
were awarded through an Open Door Direct Negotiation Process.
198
 This system was however 
criticised as it was shrouded in mystery and corruption and inherently opaque. Since then, there 
has been a shift to a more transparent process especially after the discovery of massive oil deposits 
on the Jubilee Fields and the rise of the commercial viability of the extractive industry especially 
oil and gas.
199





195 Section 1, Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 (Act 919).  
196 World Trade Organisation, Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat – Ghana, WT/TPR/S/298, 9, 79.  
197 Resource Watch Institute, The 2013 Resource Governance Index: A Measure of Transparency and 
Accountability in the Oil Gas and Mining Sector, 14. At <www.revenuewatch.org/rgi> on 3
rd
 January, 2019.  
198 Katharina Neureiter and Nick Travis et al, Mineral Rights to Human Rights: Mobilising Resources from the 
Extractive Industries for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (Case Study, Ghana), WaterAid, 2017, 20.
  
199 ADO, R. 2016. Accounting, accountability and governance in upstream petroleum contracts: the case of local 
content sustainability in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. Robert Gordon University, PhD thesis. Held on OpenAIR 
[online]. Available from: https://openair.rgu.ac.uk
  
200 Tutu Benefoh, Daniel & Ackom, Emmanuel, Energy and low carbon development efforts in Ghana: institutional arrangements, initiatives, 
challenges and the way forward, 2016, A I M S Energy, 4(3), 481-503. DOI. 
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The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act further provides for the baseline terms of the 
essential terms of a contract that must be present in a licence/contract to oil prospecting firms. It 
also includes the minimum work requirements that a licensee must perform in order for its licence 
to be renewed.
201
 The Act also encompasses reporting standards on the findings and appraising 
the Commission on their activities as a way of promoting transparency. 
 
4.8.5 Salient Features in Management of Oil Blocks in Ghana 
 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 under Section 10(14) provides for the right 
of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to hold an initial participating interest of at 
least 15 per cent for exploration and development. This comes at the initial stages of the excursion. 
This is distinguished from the Nigerian concept of back-in-rights which come up at a later stage 
when the exploring firm has already recouped its expenses in prospecting and research expenses. 
 
The Act at section 25 further provides for the reporting and appraisal of the prospecting company 
of any oil fields by the authority as the case may be
202
. The aim of this has been the monitoring 
of activities of the extractive firms and minimising revenue leakages as well as promoting 
transparency which is the core objective under section 4 of the Act
203
. Such information is in turn 
made applicable to the public and other authorities as may be necessary to monitor the activities 
of the extractive firms. 
 
The GNPC further has the option of acquiring an additional participating interest as determined in 
the petroleum agreement within a specified period of time. The pre-emptive right of the Ghanaian 
National Petroleum Corporation is unfettered and can acquire participating interest in the 
excursion in order to maximise the benefit for the Ghanaian people and to ensure that the citizenry 




In summary, the petroleum agreement entered into between the prospecting firm and the 




Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016, Section 23. 
202
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016, Section 25 
203
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016, Section 5  
204
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extend. This ensures that a single entity does not hold on to a licence for far too long and further 
to enhance transparency and accountability. The law in Ghana also requires that a change of 
ownership of the contracting party is subject to the consent of the Minister or Commission, and 







From the analysis of the two comparative jurisdictions, valuable lessons can be learned and 
incorporated into Kenya’s system in a bid to promote transparency in oil block licensing. First, 
from the Ghanaian model where the Ghanaian National Petroleum Corporation gets an initial 
carried interest of 15% hence ensuring the state through the corporation gets to participate and 
benefit from the state resources directly as a shareholder. In Kenya, the National Oil Corporation 
is a similar candidate that can be allowed to have a stake in each of the oil exploration expeditions 
and hence increasing government revenue. 
 
From the UK model, the publication of oil licence and contracts is a key concept that the Kenyan 
model should emulate. The Government of the Republic of Kenya has been known to keep 
confidential information relating to oil contracts and licences. The UK system, on the other hand, 
has published such contracts which are freely accessible to the public. The same applies to Ghana 
which as has been demonstrated herein has managed to entrench contract transparency and 
governance by making the contracts freely available to the public. Kenya is therefore encouraged 
to model its system along with the open access initiative and further join the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
 
The UK system has further entrenched its fundamental terms and conditions that must be present 
in each licence/contract such that parties limit the negotiation to the physical location of 
explorative blocks. This offers an incentive against keeping the contents of a contract confidential. 
Even as Kenya enacts laws that reflect the newfound status as an oil producing nation, it should 
consider entrenching the suitable terms and conditions in the statute. This is crucial in ensuring 




 Katharina Neureiter and Nick Travis et al, Mineral Rights to Human Rights: Mobilising Resources from the 
Extractive Industries for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (Case Study, Ghana), WaterAid, 2017, 20. 
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The main import of this chapter is to highlight the sum purpose of this research and its findings. It 
pulls together the similar experiences as well as the illuminating factors that will in turn aid 
Kenya’s growing oil and gas sector and guide discussion and framework into the best policy, legal 
and regulatory structure and the latent or patent flaws thereon. 
 
The total of all this is to contribute to a market that operates optimally, rewards efficiency and 
innovation and in turn, leads to efficient distribution of wealth.
206
 As Robert Jennings postulates 
‘the main purpose of academic writing should be to perceive and portray patterns and relations in 
a body of legal rules to make it manageable, teachable, comprehensible and usable.’
207
 This 
chapter hopes to remain true to that noble task and to offer plausible solutions and 





Crystallising from the research herein, taking into account the fact that the Kenyan oil and gas 
legal regime is in transition following the enactment of the new Energy Act and the Petroleum Act, 
much is cast to speculation as to its effectiveness. However, it is worthy to note that the legal and 
policy parameters as enacted by parliament offer a positive shift inclined towards transparency, 
better information access and inclusivity. As seen in chapter two, there is now an established data 
collection centre that ensures the centralisation of information relating to oil and gas. This is in 
line with the global best practice of information access, disclosure and availability. The data centre 
will also be instrumental in growing the database and ensuring the integrity of the data for better 




Philip Sutherland & Katharine Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa (2014) at 1-67. 68. 
207
Roberts Jennings Q C, in his foreword to Philippe Sands and Ruth Mackenzie, Principles of International 
Environmental Law (3rd Ed 2012) 21. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, however, and the comparative jurisprudence herein in the case of 
Famfa Oil Limited, the implication of a weak link in a system cannot be gainsaid. The Famfa Oil 
case herein has offered a critical glimpse at the effect of administrative law. Kenya, in this case, is 
no exception. The Petroleum Act, still vests substantive powers in the Cabinet Secretary and the 
potential for abuse cannot be overlooked. As was observed in the Famfa Case, the need for safety 
valves in ensuring that a state is not in limbo when it comes to deriving benefit from its resources 
can only be found in a sound system with adequate security and safeguards to prevent the potential 
abuse of power. 
 
The above conclusion and findings are further stressed by the fact that there is no precise set 
mechanism for conducting the bidding rounds. The current law enacted merely provides for 
competitive bidding in the allocation of licence blocks to exploration firms. There is no legally 
laid procedure or the criteria for determining the responsiveness or otherwise of a bid. This may 
justify the arbitrary exercise of power by the Cabinet Secretary as it widens his discretion. This 
poses a significant challenge that in some circumstances may be susceptible to abuse. This should 
be addressed at the backdrop that the upstream oil and gas sector now has an independent regulator, 
the EPRA. The delimitation of functions between EPRA and the Cabinet Secretary thus needs to 
be relooked, so that the independent regulator is not reduced to a mere conveyor belt for ministerial 
fiat. 
 
In the conclusion segment of chapter three, the research buttressed the import of “back – in – 
rights” as observed in other jurisdictions such as Nigeria and the United States.
208
 Kenya has not 
in its new dispensation hinted to such an approach to increase the benefit from natural resources. 
This approach can, therefore, be borrowed and chiselled into law to ensure that the state derives 
maximum benefit from the depletion of its non – renewable resources. 
 
This thesis has thus shown that international best practice on transparency in bidding and licensing 
rounds demand that a clear and well-laid procedure with adequate safeguards and checks and 
balances is essential in achieving transparency and effectiveness in the sector. A holistic review of 
the Kenyan laws herein, however, shows that even though improvements have been made with the 
enactment of the new laws, they still fall short of some key aspects of 
 
 
208 Supra note 178 and 179. 
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international standards. The recommendations herein will thus come in handy to cure such flaws 





The conclusions above demonstrate that Kenya’s budding oil sector has a lot to learn and a myriad 
of challenges to grapple with. With the benefit of hindsight, however, taking the experience, 
challenges and successes of other jurisdictions, the recommendations herein are therefore a 
culmination of experiences and lessons learnt from other jurisdictions. The recommendations are 
as follows: 
 
5.2.1 Amend the Petroleum Act, 2019 to clearly define the procedure and parameters 
 
governing bidding rounds 
 
The need for a clearly defined procedure and parameters for conducting a bid, licensing or renewal 
is evident from the Famfa Oil Limited case pitting it against the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation. Technical flaws or lack of clarity in a system or the law can be costly and fatal. 
 
5.2.2 Truncate the powers of the Cabinet Secretary to limit and define circumstances 
in which s/he may unilaterally negotiate with an extractive firm in the absence 
of a responsive bid 
 
Under the newly enacted Petroleum Act, 2019, the Cabinet Secretary in charge of Mining and 
Petroleum still retains considerable powers in negotiating petroleum agreements. As has been 
proven by the Famfa Oil case study, such powers are prone to abuse. This anomaly coupled with 
the fact that the procedure for conducting a bidding round is not stipulated adds to the flaw. The 
Act provides that the Cabinet Secretary can enter into direct negotiations with an extractive firm 
where no bid is received or where the bids are not responsive. There is a latent danger in this model 
as the big industry players have been known to pay off small players in what has been termed as 
“pay for delay”. This anti-trust practice locks out competitive bids leaving only the key player who 
has paid off other parties to negotiate with the Cabinet Secretary. 
 
The flaw therefore is a threat to the vision of achieving transparency in the licensing system, 
bidding and management of hydrocarbon blocks. The proposal of this research, therefore, is an 
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amendment to the Act to ensure that the circumstances in which the Cabinet Secretary can 
negotiate directly with an extractive firm is stringent and subjected to scrutiny to weed out anti-
trust practices. This will go a long way in sanitising the system and reducing the possibility of 
abuse of the powers currently vested in the Cabinet Secretary. This will avert the arbitrariness 
observed in 1993 during the grant of exploration licences to Famfa Oil Limited and other players 
during the Nigerian military rule. 
 
5.2.3 Transfer the Power to Directly Negotiate to an Independent Body 
 
The sum finding of the potential flaws and latent dangers of concentrating power in a single 
individual i.e. the Cabinet Secretary points to the need for transfer of power. This research, 
therefore, postulates that as an alternative of truncating the power of the Cabinet Secretary on the 
circumstances in which he can negotiate independently. The power to negotiate should be 
transferred to the Energy and Petroleum Authority which has the necessary powers and expertise 
on oil and gas. Further, the Authority is made up of a number of experts and therefore there is 
collective reasoning and promotion of justice and inclusivity as opposed to concentrating powers 
in a single individual who can engineer the desired result or act ultra vires with no repercussions. 
Further, vesting the power to negotiate will place any appeals from the decision of the authority 
on the Tribunal which is equally constituted of persons with expertise in oil and gas. 
 
5.2.4 Legislation to introduce “Back – in – rights” in Kenya 
 
From the research, it can be deduced that it is in the interest of a country as the trustee of a people's 
non-renewable resources to ensure that they benefit from its depletion. As observed, the Nigerian 
perspective of “Back-in-rights” and its implementation thereof in other jurisdictions like the 
United States point to a good concept. The rights have aimed to ensure that the nation reaps 
maximum benefit from the depletion of its resources. This is often after the extractive firms have 
recouped their costs used in exploration and prospecting for oil. 
 
In the preliminary stages of this research, it was observed that due to lack of technical capacity in 
oil exploration, the government often places reliance on multinational corporations to conduct 
explorations. Without such rights under the Kenyan law, the government has no substantive means 
of benefiting directly from oil exploration. It is, therefore, the recommendation of this research 
that the law be amended to allow the National Oil Corporation to have back-in-rights 
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after the multinational corporations have recouped their costs expended in exploration and 
prospecting. This will be instrumental in increasing the benefit that is derived from the people of 
Kenya. 
 
5.2.5 Chiselling terms of Licence into Statute to Weed out Independent Negotiations 
 
As witnessed in the case of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, the terms of a petroleum 
licence are set out in statute. This, therefore, means that all the players are subjected to a single 
standard and parties are not free to negotiate independent terms away from those laid in statute. 
This anti-deviation stance is what promotes transparency and diffuses the incentive to keep 
petroleum contracts or information relating to petroleum secrets. This in turn promotes 
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